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Abstract
At each point in time, price dynamics in a market are determined by a
market for access to trading partners, implemented by competitive proﬁt-
maximizing brokers. This mechanism is applied to a market in which the
value of a good declines over time and buyers decide optimally when to
reenter the market and buy a new unit. Price adjustment paths in response
to increases and decreases in demand are then derived using the diﬀerential
equations generated by the model.
1. Introduction
This paper demonstrates that equilibrium in a market for access to trading part-
ners can be used to analyze disequilibrium price dynamics in a market for a good.
The market for access to trading partners is generated by competitive proﬁt-
maximizing brokers who charge fees and can oﬀer alternative ratios of buyers to
∗The author is indebted to Michael Jerison, Laurence Kranich and Kwan Koo Yun for helpful
comments. Remaining errors are the author’s responsibility.sellers in a market in which the number of trades is determined by a matching
function. At each point in time, the fee charged by brokers determines the change
in the price, which yields the disequilibrium price dynamics.
In the standard textbook supply and demand model without frictions, there is
no cost to ﬁnding a trading partner in equilibrium. In disequilibrium, with excess
demand or supply, some buyers or sellers are unable to ﬁnd trading partners at
the current price. With excess demand, for example, not all buyers are able to
ﬁnd sellers, so that access to trading partners has a value to buyers. However,
that access is not priced in the standard model. A market for access to trading
partners, if it operated, would set a fee for access to sellers. This fee, added to the
current price, would determine the disequilibrium price. If the price is updated
at each point in time, the fee determines the rate of change of the price.
In this paper, the market for access to trading partners is implemented by
proﬁt-seeking brokers. At any point in time, the number of trades is a function
(called the matching function) of the number of buyers and number of sellers.1
B u y e r sp r e f e ral o w e rr a t i oo fb u y e r st os e l l e r s ,a n da r ew i l l i n gt op a yaf e et og e ta
ratio lower than a given ratio. Sellers prefer a higher ratio of buyers to sellers, and
would need to be paid a fee to accept a lower ratio. Buyers and sellers both have
trade-oﬀs between the fee and the ratio of buyers to sellers. Competition among
brokers results in fees such that buyer and seller indiﬀerence curves are tangent.
A market for access to trading partners then arises because buyers and sellers
f a c et h es a m et r a d e - o ﬀs between fee and ratio of buyers to sellers, which aﬀects
the likelihood of trading. The market for access to trading partners implemented
by brokers determines the fee and price change in the short run, in which some
element of the market is in disequilibrium. The role of brokers in bringing about
equilibrium in a market is discussed in Sattinger (2000). Related work on brokers
(or middlemen) and equilibrium is by Nti and Shubik (1984), Rubenstein and
Wolinsky (1987), Gehrig (1993), Yava¸ s (1994, 1996), Serrano (1995), Wooders
(1997) and Mortensen and Wright (1997).
Characterization of price determination through a market for access to trading
partners has several antecedents. Search is a market mechanism used by agents
to ﬁnd trading partners (see the survey by Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). In
the context of labor markets, Sattinger (1990) analyzes a market for interviews
that generates the same eﬃciency conditions as occur in this paper (see also
Sattinger, 1995, for a comparison with Nash bargaining). Moen (1997) develops
1The matching function is discussed by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999, pp. 2575-2578) and
Pissarides (2000, pp. 6-7).
2a model of competitive search equilibrium. Various authors have studied markets
for contracts, including Gale (1992, 1994), Peters (1997, 1999), Shimer (1996) and
Wilson (1989). Chatterjee and Dutta (1998) analyze competition for bargaining
partners. Sattinger (2002) analyzes a queuing mechanism that generates a market
for access to trading partners. Lu and McAfee (1996) and Moreno and Wooders
(1999) have analyzed price dynamics with rationing.
The basic mechanism for determining the price in disequilibrium must be com-
bined with speciﬁc assumptions about the market for the good in order to generate
deterministic price paths. In this paper, buyers purchase a single unit of a durable
good that declines in value over time. At an optimally determined age of the good,
they dispose of the good and reenter the market to buy a new one. If the terms of
trade improve (e.g., the price goes down), buyers will reenter the market sooner,
so that the number of buyers in the market at one point in time goes up. Sellers
face a particular cost of the good and reenter the market as soon as they have sold
the good. At a particular point in time, buyers are heterogeneous because they
hold goods acquired at diﬀerent times in the past. However, when they enter the
market to buy a new good, their valuation of the good is the same. As a result
of these assumptions, buyers on the market at a point in time will have identical
indiﬀerence curves through a point (determined by the fee, prevailing price, and
ratio of buyers to sellers). If buyers and sellers in the market were heterogeneous,
trade could not occur at a single ratio of buyers to sellers if the discount rate is
positive and instead an equilibrium price function would arise (see discussions by
Mortensen and Wright, 1997, Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, pp. 2589-2591, and
Sattinger, 2000). Mortensen and Wright (1997) show that the dispersion in prices
and ratio declines to zero as the discount rate approaches zero.
Section II develops the model, including matching function and behavior of
buyers, sellers and brokers. Section III determines the conditions for long run
equilibrium. Section IV then develops the diﬀerential equations determining the
price dynamics. Section V presents conclusions and discusses extensions.
2. Model
2.1. Matching Technology
Suppose that buyers and sellers in a market must ﬁnd each other before a trade can
take place. Let M(x,y) be the rate at which trades (or matches) occur between
buyers and sellers if there are x buyers and y sellers. When buyers and sellers
3ﬁnd trading partners without a broker, they are price takers and the trade takes
place at the current price P.A s s u m eM(x,y) is homogeneous of degree one and
has continuous ﬁrst and second order partial derivatives. Assume further that
M1(x,y)=∂M(x,y)/∂x > 0 if y>0 (2.1)
M2(x,y)=∂M(x,y)/∂y > 0 if x>0 (2.2)
M11(x,y)=∂
2M(x,y)/∂x
2 < 0 (2.3)
M22(x,y)=∂
2M(x,y)/∂y
2 < 0 (2.4)
M(0,y)=M(x,0) = 0 (2.5)
The conditions on M11(x,y) and M22(x,y) reﬂect diminishing marginal prod-
ucts of buyers and sellers in the production of trades, which are standard assump-
tions in neoclassical production theory. The other conditions are not required in
neoclassical production theory but are reasonable in the context of the production
of trades. The conditions that M1(x,y) > 0 if y>0 and M2(x,y) > 0 if x>0
specify that adding buyers or sellers always raises the number of trades if there are
already trading partners in the market. Also, the condition M(0,y)=M(x,0) = 0
is imposed because no trades can take place if there are no trading partners of
one type.
Since M(x,y) is homogeneous of degree one,
M(x,y)=yM(x/y,1) (2.6)
In the absence of a broker, if there are QD buyers and QS sellers, the number
of trades per unit of time will be M(QD,Q S)=QSM(QD/QS,1) = QSM(θ,1),
where θ = QD/QS. The rate at which a buyer gets a good is M(θ,1)QS/QD =
M(θ,1)/θ, and the rate at which a supplier sells the good is M(θ,1)QS/QS =
M(θ,1). To simplify notation, let m(θ)=M(θ,1).
2.2. Buyers
Suppose a buyer holds at most one unit of a durable good at a time and obtains
instantaneous utility VGe−δa from a good that is now a units of time old. Suppose
VG is the same for all buyers. If the buyer plans on replacing the good at age µ,
4t h ea s s e tv a l u eo fh o l d i n gag o o do fa g ea is
WBG(a,P,F,θ,µ)=
Z µ
a
e
−r(x−a)VGe
−δxdx + e
−r(µ−a)WB(P,F,θ,µ)
=
e−δa − e−δµ−r(µ−a)
r + δ
VG + e
−r(µ−a)WB(P,F,θ,µ) (2.7)
where r is the discount rate (the same for all agents) and WB(P,F,θ,µ) is the
asset value of being in the market for the good when the price is P, broker fee is
F (if a broker is used; otherwise F =0 )and the ratio of buyers to sellers is θ. The
ﬂow of asset value from being in the market is
rWB(P,F,θ,µ)=−cb +
m(θ)
θ
(WBG(0,P,F,θ,µ) − WB(P,F,θ,µ) − P − F)
(2.8)
where cb is the cost per period of being in the market, m(θ)/θ i st h er a t eo f
ﬁnding a seller per unit of time, P and F are the price to the seller and fee to the
broker paid by the buyer if a seller is found, and WBG(0,P,F,θ,µ) is the asset
value of having a new good. The fee can be positive or negative, or zero if no
broker is used. Substituting WBG(0,P,F,θ,µ) from 2.7 into 2.8 and solving for
WB(P,F,θ,µ) yields
WB(P,F,θ,µ)=
¡
(VG(1 − e−µ(r+δ))/(r + δ)) − (P + F)
¢
(m(θ)/θ) − cb
r +( 1− e−rµ)m(θ)/θ
(2.9)
This is the buyer’s objective function when in the market. The construction of
the asset equations for the buyer assume that the buyer at each point in time has
static expectations that the variables P, F, θ and µ w i l lh a v et h es a m ev a l u e si n
the future as they have now. An important extension is to develop asset equations
that incorporate expectations of changes in prices and other variables. Optimizing
WB(P,F,θ,µ) with respect to µ (or equivalently optimizing WBG(0,P,F,θ,µ)
with respect to µ) yields a ﬁrst order condition for the optimal time to reenter
the market. The optimal age of the good, µ, satisﬁes
WB(P,F,θ,µ)=e
−δµVG/r (2.10)
When this condition holds, the ﬂow of asset value from being in the market to
buy a new good equals the ﬂow of utility from the old good. The second order
5condition can be shown to hold.2 The calculation of optimal µ is only relevant to
the decision to buy a new good when the buyer is on the verge of reentering the
market. However, calculations of µ are also relevant to the value of a new good
when the buyer is in the market. Because of the exponential function involving µ,
the optimal age of the good cannot be found analytically.3 However, it is possible
to solve for the price at which a given value of µ is optimal. Let Pµ(θ,F,µ) be
the price that satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition for µ, given θ,F, and µ.
By setting WB(P,F,θ,µ) equal to a constant and solving for F, it is possible
to obtain a particular indiﬀerence curve for the buyer. Let MRSB(P,F,θ,µ) be
the buyer’s marginal rate of substitution of fee for ratio θ; this is the same as
the absolute value of the slope of the buyer’s indiﬀerence curve at a given point
(taking P and µ as given). For a general matching function satisfying 2.1 through
2.5, it is ambiguous whether the indiﬀerence curve (between F and θ) is concave.
However, the indiﬀerence curve is unambiguously concave for a constant elasticity
of substitution matching function with positive elasticity of substitution.
Let QDt be the number of buyers in the market at time t and let QB be the
total number of buyers, with and without the good. The eﬀect of changes in µ on
numbers reentering is shown in Figure 2.1. If µ is constant, the line at t−µ moves
right at the same rate as time passes, so that the number of buyers reentering is
just the number of buyers in the market µ time units previously, QDt−µ,t i m e st h e
rate at which they got trades, m(θt−µ)/θt−µ, where θt−µ is the ratio of buyers to
sellers at time t − µ. If µ is increasing, the line at t − µ moves right at a slower
speed than the line at t, and the rate at which buyers reenter is reduced to
QDt−µ(m(θt−µ)/θt−µ)
d(t − µ)
dt
= QDt−µ(m(θt−µ)/θt−µ)
µ
1 −
dµ
dt
¶
(2.11)
If µ is decreasing, the line moves rightward faster than t, and the number reentering
is greater than QDt−µ(m(θt−µ)/θt−µ). The rate of change of QDt in general is
dQDt
dt
= QDt−µ(m(θt−µ)/θt−µ)
d(t − µ)
dt
− QDt(m(θt)/θt)+QNt (2.12)
2Suppose the buyer considers extending the length of time that the current good will be held,
holding future optimal ages constant. Then the value of being in the market, WB(P,F,θ,µ),
will be unaﬀected by the extension. The second derivative of WBG(a,P,F,θ,µ) with respect to
µ, evaluated at a = µ, is −δe−δµVG, satisfying the second order condition for a maximization.
3Series expansions of the exponential functions around their expected values can be used to
obtain accurate analytical expressions for the optimal age.
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Figure 2.1: Number of Buyers in Market
where QNtis the rate of entry or exit of buyers from the economy and QDt(m(θt)/θt)
is the rate at which current buyers get the good and leave the market. In the dy-
namic analysis to be undertaken in Section 4, QNt provides a means by which a
disequilibrium, equivalent to a shift in demand, can be analyzed.
2.3. Sellers
Sellers produce one good at a time at cost VS, the same for all sellers. After a
sale, sellers immediately reenter the market. A seller’s expected proﬁta tap o i n t
in time is
WS(P,F,θ)=−cs + m(θ)(P + F − VS) (2.13)
where cs is the cost of participating in the market, P is the price received for the
good, F is the fee paid by a broker for the seller’s participation, m(θ) is the rate
of getting trades per unit of time, and θ is again the ratio of buyers to sellers. The
fee F could be zero, if no broker is used, or it could be positive or negative.
Setting WS(P,F,θ) equal to a constant and solving for F yields the seller’s
indiﬀerence curve between F and θ. Let MRSS(P,F,θ) be the seller’s marginal
rate of substitution of F for θ. For a general matching function, the indiﬀerence
curve for sellers is unambiguously convex.
7Let QS be the number of sellers on the market. Suppose the number of sellers
is an increasing function of WS(P,F,θ):
QS = S0 (WS(P,F,θ))
β ,S 0,β>0 (2.14)
(Alternatively, the number of sellers could be taken to be constant.)
2.4. Requirements for Trade
For trade to occur, parameter values must be such that WB(P,F,θ,µ) > 0 and
WS(P,F,θ) > 0. From 2.8 (after solving for WB(P,F,θ,µ)) and 2.13, it follows
that
WBG(0,P,F,θ,µ) − P − F ≥
cbθ
m(θ)
(2.15)
and
P + F − VS ≥
cs
m(θ)
(2.16)
From 2.10, as WB(P,F,θ,µ) approaches zero, µ increases indeﬁnitely. Buyers hold
on to the old good since buying a new good yields a negligible increase in asset
value. A lower bound for WBG(0,P,F,θ,µ) arises when WB(P,F,θ,µ)=0 ;then
WBG(0,P,F,θ,µ)=VG/(r + δ), the value of getting a new good and holding it
indeﬁnitely. Substituting this lower bound into 2.15 and combining the inequalities
yields
VG
r + δ
− VS ≥
cbθ + cs
m(θ)
(2.17)
The term on the right in this condition is the cost in participation fees per trade.
Its minimum value depends on m(θ) and occurs when
m0(θ)
m(θ) − θm0(θ)
=
∂M/∂QD
∂M/∂QS
=
cb
cs
(2.18)
When this condition holds, the contributions of marginal buyers and sellers to
trades are proportional to participation costs. The condition in 2.17 imposes
restrictions on VG,V S,δ,r,c b,c s and the matching function that must be satisﬁed
for trade to occur. As demonstrated by Mortensen and Wright (1997), there is a
suﬃciently high interest rate at which no trades will occur.
82.5. Brokers
Brokers operate by oﬀering alternative ratios of buyers to sellers and charging
fees, using the same matching technology available to buyers and sellers in the
absence of brokers. Assume that brokers incur no added costs in operating. To
see how brokers can bring about equilibrium in the market for access to trading
partners, suppose buyer and seller indiﬀerence curves (between the fee and the
ratio of buyers to sellers) intersect at the prevailing price. Then a broker can make
ap r o ﬁtb yo ﬀering a ratio at which the fee a buyer is willing to pay exceeds the
fee a seller is willing to receive in order to engage in trade at that ratio. (Because
the indiﬀerence curves intersect, this must occur at either a higher ratio or a lower
ratio.) Free entry of proﬁt-maximizing brokers implies that the indiﬀerence curve
for buyers is nowhere above the indiﬀerence curve for sellers. The fee charged to
buyers will then equal the fee paid to sellers (or else the fee charged to sellers
will equal the fee paid to buyers). This occurs when the indiﬀerence curve for
buyers is tangent to the indiﬀerence curve for sellers, at which point proﬁts are
eliminated. At the point of tangency, buyer and seller trade-oﬀs between fee and
ratio of buyers to sellers are equal and any search externalities of buyer or seller
entry are eliminated.4
Although the distinction between price and fee is useful in describing the
behavior of brokers, it is more convenient to work with the sum in calculating
price dynamics. This is possible since P and F enter the buyer and seller as-
set equations in the same way, so that WB(P,F,θ,µ)=WB(P + F,0,θ,µ) and
WS(P,F,θ)=WS(P + F,0,θ).L e t p = P + F. The condition that the sum of
price and fee is such that the indiﬀerence curves are tangent can be found analyt-
ically by setting MRSB(p,0,θ,µ) equal to MRSS(p,0,θ) and solving for p. Let
ptan(θ,µ) be the value of p at which the indiﬀerence curves are tangent, given θ
and µ. Also, let WS(p,θ)=WS(p,0,θ) and pµ(θ,µ)=Pµ(θ,0,µ).
3. Long Run Equilibrium
Long run equilibrium can be determined when the rate of entry or exit of buyers
from the economy, QNt, is zero. The conditions for long run equilibrium are:
1. Buyers optimally choose the age of the good at reentry.
4Mortensen and Wright (1997) show that tangent indiﬀerence curves satisfy the Hosios con-
dition for absence of search externalities (Hosios, 1990).
92. Competitive brokers eliminate all proﬁtable brokerage opportunities, so that
buyers and sellers have the same marginal rates of substitution between the
price and the ratio of buyers to sellers.
3. The ratio of buyers to sellers, θ, equals QD/QS, where QD and QS are
determined endogenously.
4 .T h er a t eo fc h a n g eo fQD is zero for at least the last µ units of time.
The values of the variables in long run equilibrium can be determined as fol-
lows. Conditions 1 and 2 above hold when
p = pµ(θ,µ) (3.1)
and
p = ptan(θ,µ) (3.2)
respectively. Let QB be the total number of buyers, either in the market or with
the good. Then in the long run, taking the sum,
QB = QD + µQDm(θ)/θ (3.3)
or
QD =
QB
1+µm(θ)/θ
(3.4)
From condition 4, using 2.13 and 3.4,
θ =
QB/(1 + µm(θ)/θ)
S0 (WS(p,θ))
β (3.5)
Then 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 can in general be solved for p, θ and µ. Existence and
uniqueness arise if the relation between p and θ generated by the tangency con-
dition (with µ adjusting optimally) intersects the relation generated by 3.5, again
with µ adjusting optimally, at one and only one point.5
In the example worked out in the following section on price dynamics, the long
run equilibrium is given by p =8 .45,θ=1 ,µ=2 0and QB =3 .85.6
5Existence and uniqueness are proven formally in Sattinger (1999) using a simpler model of
buyer behavior.
6The other parameters are r = .1,δ= .15,V S =8 ,c b = .1,c s = .05,V G =2 .51,Q B =3 .85,
s0=1and β =1 . The matching function is given by m(θ)=θ/(1 + θ). This is a constant
elasticity of substitution production function with elasticity equal to one-half. In practice, since
an analytic solution for µ cannot be given, µ and θ are chosen and the system is solved for p,
VG and QB.
104. Short Run Dynamics
This section develops the diﬀerential equations that hold for p, θ, µ and QD at
each point in time. In the short run, conditions 1, 2 and 3 in Section 2.6 are
assumed to hold, but condition 4 does not necessarily hold. Then changes in QD
over time generate ﬂuctuations in p, θ and µ. Let
EQ1=p − pµ(θ,µ) (4.1)
EQ2=p − ptan(θ,µ) (4.2)
EQ3=θ − QD/
³
S0 (WS(p,θ))
β
´
(4.3)
where the arguments of EQ1,E Q 2 and EQ3 (which are p, θ, µ and QD) are
suppressed to simplify notation. Since EQ1,E Q 2 and EQ3 are zero at each point
in time, they yield three conditions on the derivatives dp/dt, dθ/dt, dµ/dt and
dQD/dt. A fourth condition arises from 2.12. Let A be the four by four matrix
A ≡

 

∂EQ1/∂p ∂EQ1/∂θ ∂EQ1/∂µ ∂EQ1/∂QDt
∂EQ2/∂p ∂EQ2/∂θ ∂EQ2/∂µ ∂EQ2/∂QDt
∂EQ3/∂p ∂EQ3/∂θ ∂EQ3/∂µ ∂EQ3/∂QDt
00( m(θt−µ)/θt−µ)QDt−µ 1

 

Let R be the four by one vector
R ≡




0
0
0
(m(θt−µ)/θt−µ)QDt−µ − (m(θt)/θt)QDt + QNt




Let D be the four by one vector
D ≡




dp/dt
dθ/dt
dµ/dt
dQD/dt




Then AD = R and D = A−1R. Since only the fourth entry of R is nonzero,
the derivatives only depend on the fourth column of A−1. The derivatives will all
have the same sign and will be proportional to the fourth entry of R at each point
in time. Whenever dQD/dt =0 , the other derivatives will also be zero, even if
the market is not in long run equilibrium. The derivatives A−1R can be derived
analytically so the derivatives can be found at each point in time.
Figures 4.1 through 4.4 present two dynamic solutions resulting from an in-
crease and a decrease in demand. Figure 4.1 shows the price dynamics, with both
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Figure 4.1: Price Dynamics from Shifts in Demand
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13paths starting from the same long run equilibrium. Figure 4.2 shows the optimal
age of the good, Figure 4.3 shows the ratio of buyers to sellers, θ, and Figure
4.4 shows the number of buyers on the market, QD. The upper curves show the
response to an increase in demand, and the lower curves show the response to a
decrease in demand. The solutions assume the system is in long run equilibrium
(described in the previous section) for the previous 20 units of time. Then at time
0, for the demand increase, QNt increases linearly from 0 to 0.2 at time 10, and
then declines linearly from .2 to 0 at time 20, after which it is zero. For the de-
mand decrease, QNt decreases linearly from 0 to -.2 at time 10, and then increases
from -.2 to 0 at time 20, after which it is zero. These demand shifts change QB
by .2.
Because QDt−µ and θt−µ s t a yt h es a m eu n t i lt − µ =0 , there is initially no
feedback from the new entrants to the number reentering. For the demand in-
crease, as QD increases from the new entrants, p and θ go up. Buyers holding
goods respond by raising µ, so that fewer reenter the market even though QDt−µ
is constant for some time. The reduction in reentrants moderates the increase in
current number of buyers, QDt, from the new entrants. As θ increases, the rate
of matching for buyers, m(θ)/θ, declines until dQD/dt =0 . Then since QNt is
declining in this example, dQD/dt goes negative, leading to reductions in p, θ and
µ. At t =2 0 , the number of buyers continues to decline because no more new
entrants are coming in, although the number reentering is increasing because µ
is declining. At t =2 0 .75, the optimal age of the good is also 20.75. Then the
buyers who got the good at t =0 , when disequilibrium started, start to reenter
the market. Their eﬀect is to raise the current number of buyers in the market.
After t =2 0 , what happens at a peak or trough depends on what is happening to
the number reentering, (m(θt−µ)/θt−µ)QDt−µ. Eventually, the market approaches
a new equilibrium, with higher price, ratio of buyers to sellers, age of good at
reentry, and number of buyers in the market. Although the distribution of buyers
by age of good is initially uneven after entry or exit of buyers, the eﬀect of the
price ﬂuctuations appears to be to smooth out that distribution. The eﬀects of
a demand decrease of the same magnitude are not symmetric to the eﬀects of a
demand increase. Because µ is reduced by a demand decrease, buyers from t =2 0
reenter at an earlier point in time, so that the troughs of the variables from a
demand decrease occur before the peaks from the demand increase.
The purpose of these derivations is to demonstrate that at each point in time,
the price is determined by the market for access to trading partners, implemented
by broker proﬁt-seeking activity. Application of the equilibrium conditions for
14the market for access to trading partners provides a model of disequilibrium price
determination (disequilibrium in the sense that the long run condition dQDt/dt =
0 is not satisﬁed).
5. Conclusions
In the model developed in this paper, the price at any point in time is determined
by the equilibrium in the market for access to trading partners instead of by the
condition that quantity demanded equal quantity supplied. The market for access
to trading partners operates even when the market for the good is in disequilib-
rium, in the sense that the number of buyers is changing over time. It is generated
by the actions of proﬁt-seeking competitive brokers, whose fees set implicit prices
for the contacts between trading partners.
A market for access to trading partners implemented by brokers solves several
problems in the determination of price in a single market. First, it explains how
the price changes in a market when buyers and sellers are all price takers. Brokers
are motivated by proﬁt-maximization to set fees that eﬀectively change prices
whenever the market is in disequilibrium. Compared to brokers, auctioneers in
a Walrasian system have no proﬁt motive for their function. While brokers have
the power to set fees, they are competitive in the sense of being buyer and seller
status takers, i.e., they cannot aﬀect the asset levels of buyers and sellers in the
market.
Second, the price mechanism is the same in equilibrium as in disequilibrium. It
is therefore unnecessary to develop a separate model to explain price determination
in disequilibrium, when buyers and sellers would have some degree of monopoly
and monopsony power in the absence of broker activity. In the broker model,
buyers and sellers continue to exhibit competitive price-taking behavior, even
when the market for the good is in disequilibrium.
Finally, the market for access to trading partners implemented by brokers
generates dynamic paths of adjustment of price. Since the fee generated by brokers
determines the change in price, the diﬀerential equation relating rate of change in
price to the price itself can be found, along with the other diﬀerential equations
in the system. In contrast, the Walrasian model requires additional assumptions
to generate dynamics (e.g., the rate of change of prices is proportional to excess
demand or supply).
The model emphasizes the important role of brokers in generating a market
for an economic good (access to trading partners) that would otherwise not ex-
15ist. In the absence of broker activities, buyers and sellers would have no simple
mechanism for trading money for access to trading partners.
The models developed here are based on naive, static expectations. Buyers
make decisions about reentry based on expectations that prices and conditions of
trade will continue indeﬁnitely. Such expectations are counterfactual in a model
of price dynamics. The next step is to incorporate price and market condition
changes into optimal buyer behavior in the generation of price dynamics.
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